The Eclipse and
Recovery of Beauty: A Lonergan Approach. By John D. Dadosky. Buffalo, NY:
University of Toronto Press, 2014. 255 pages. $65.00.
It is a rare treat to read a book with a title that so
clearly captures the very purpose of the book. This book with this title does
just that. For those whose eyes glaze over at the mention of Bernard Lonergan,
John Dadosky is not one of those writers who further muddies the waters by the
use of Lonergan language and a convoluted style. Dodosky explains things. Whether you agree with his conclusions or not, he
is clear.
Straight out from the Preface he tells us why he is writing
“…to propose an intellectual framework for recovering beauty in the West.” (xi)
Dadosky bases his research in Thomas Aquinas and Lonergan, convinced that
others who have worked with the aesthetics of Thomas have not made the turn to the
subject, perhaps fearing a Kantian influence. Calling himself a meta-physician, Dadosky sets out to “…clarify
and articulate a philosophy of beauty within Lonergan’s philosophy of
intentional consciousness.” (xii)
Dadosky sketches out his approach convinced of Lonergan’s
distinction from Kant, and equally convinced that “…the eclipse of beauty
ultimately leads to the diminishment of meaning, and with this, our very
existence is inevitably threatened.” (4) In light of these convictions he
states: “I will attempt to establish a philosophy of beauty from a transposed
Thomistic perspective that has critically engaged the philosophical turn to the
subject and can respond to the legacy of doubt and skepticism left in its
wake.” (6) Rejecting the legacy of the post-modern dismissal of objective
beauty as being merely “in the eye of the beholder,” Dadosky challenges that
“…there remains a need for a philosophical basis on which we can articulate
judgments of beauty, just as we do when we make judgments of fact and judgments
of value.” (14) Thus the justification for the Lonergan approach.
With this clear and focused overture, Dadosky then delivers
an opera of characters, taking from each what serves his purpose, and
clarifying why each goes just so far and no further in serving his project of
recovery. But keeping in mind that some of his readers might be traumatized at
the very mention of Lonergan, he not only sketches Aquinas’ approach to beauty
to set a context, he sketches Lonergan’s cognitional theory to convince readers
it will be the necessary tool for the recovery. Then we are introduced to
Nietzsche, Girard, and Kierkegaard, to Balthasar, Shusterman, and Alexander. He
leaves no aspect of their theories unexamined, all this to clear the way for
his presentation of Lonergan’s levels of consciousness to provide judgments of
beauty. For this reviewer, Chapter 4, “Recovering Beauty in the Subject,” is
the climax of the book, as it is the clearest presentation of the author’s
point as he tries to realize his purpose.
Why should we read this book? Perhaps for no other reason
than to widen our horizons to realize that Lonergan was much more than a
talking head. Yes, his cognitional theory was his interest, but there is more
than cognition here. A second reading might be to expand our awareness of the
Aquinas/Lonergan connection. It is important to know how far Thomas goes, and
how Lonergan takes him further. Classical Thomism needs to be convinced
that the turn to the subject can be done
without being locked in the subjectivity it dreads. It is only with the turn,
Dadosky tells us, that we can responsibly reach the responsible objectivity we
seek.
Because of the book’s philosophical depth, I suggest it is
best for graduate studies readers, although Chapter 4 might be useful for
bright undergraduates who have been introduced to general empirical method. The
book is a refreshing “both/and” interface, offering us the richness of the
interdisciplinary approach so needed in philosophy today.
CARLA
MAE STREETER, OP
Aquinas Institute of Theology
